§1. Introduction: the mind and the 'elements' of science
In the fi rst Critique, Kant famously argues that the objects of which we can have genuine knowledge are objects that 'conform' to our capacities for knowledge (Bxvi) .
1 Kant thinks that, as a consequence, any account of science must be grounded on an analysis of the nature and limits of our cognitive capacities. Kant himself attempts just such a grounding of the sciences of mathematics and physics over the course of the fi rst Critique, the Prolegomena, and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Because Kant thinks that all of our knowledge arises from two basic capacities (two 'stems', cf., B29)-on the one hand, our capacity for sensing (intuiting, 1. I will cite Kant's fi rst Critique according to the B-edition pagination, unless it is a text found only in the A-edition; I will cite Kant's other works according to the Akademie Ausgabe (Kant 1902-) volume and page number. All decisions on translation are my own, though I have consulted (and usually followed, especially in the case of the fi rst Critique) the Cambridge Edition of Kant's works (Kant 1991-). being given) objects, what Kant calls our 'receptivity' or 'sensibility', and on the other hand, our capacity for thinking, judging, and inferring about objects, what Kant calls our 'understanding' (B74)-these two capacities themselves must form the genuine 'elements' in any account of knowledge. Th e correspondingly elementary 'doctrines' for the account of science in general, therefore, will be the sciences of sensibility and understanding, or what Kant calls 'aesthetic' and 'logic', respectively (B76). Accordingly, it is this pair of sciences that comprises the 'doctrine of the elements [Elementarlehre] ' in the analysis of our theoretical knowledge that Kant provides in the fi rst Critique itself (B29).
As .4), it is hopeless to think-as Kant seems to-that we could come to know what knowledge and science are without fi rst looking to the nature of truth itself and the nature of bearers of the property of being true (propositions). What the pursuit of such analysis will ultimately show, Bolzano thinks, is that the distinction between act and content must be drawn, not just for knowledge and science as a whole, but for each of its component parts as well. Th at is, even in the mere act of 'representing [Vorstellen]' objects, Bolzano thinks we fi nd a separate content or 'matter [Stoff ] ' in addition to the act itself, and in addition to the object represented (WL §49, I.218). Similarly, we will see that all acts of 'judgment [Urteil]' are such as to 'contain [enthalten]' a 'proposition [Satz]', something likewise distinct from both the subjective act of judging and the object and property that the judging is about (WL §34, I.154; cf., WL §290, III.108). Even in acts of
